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FROM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
costs of the cleanup on those
responsible for the contamination."
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Immediate
short-term steps to stabilize the site
are called "removal actions" and
long-term cleanup efforts are called
"remedial actions." Together, with
the incidental costs surrounding the
process, those items comprise
"response" costs. See CERCLA
§ 101(25). Standards for cleanups
and how they are to proceed
are promulgated by EPA in the
National Contingency Plan. Under
§ 107(a)(4)(A) of the statute,
responsible parties "shall be liable
for all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian
tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan." Since
the cleanups were costly and the
size of the fund seemed very, very
large at the time, the statute as a
whole took on the popular moniker,
"Superfund."
(Continued on Page 296)
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The Supreme Court summed it up
as follows: "CERCLA both provides
a mechanism for cleaning up haz-
ardous waste sites, and imposes the
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 295-301. © 2009 American Bar Association.
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Against a backdrop of environmen-
tal disasters at Love Canal in Niagra
Falls, New York, and Times Beach,
Missouri, Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980 to
address the problem of contamina-
tion resulting from the release of
hazardous substances into the envi-
ronment. The Act's structure
includes a revolving-fund approach
that allows the United States
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to perform and pay for
cleanups at contaminated sites and
then recoup those expenses by
suing the potentially responsible
parties (PRPs).
The terse nature of the quoted lia-
bility language of § 107(a) set out
above invited a period of litigation
to fully define the nature of the lia-
bility that would be imposed.
Similarly, the definition of the four
categories of responsible parties set
forth in § 107(a)(1-4) also took on
greater clarity through litigation.
Those categories are (1) present
owners or operators of the facility,
(2) owners or operators of the facili-
ty at the time of the release of the
hazardous substance(s), (3) persons
who "arranged for disposal" (some-
times called generators), and (4)
transporters who brought hazardous
substances to the facility. In this
case, Shell Oil is sued as an
arranger and Burlington Northern is
sued as both a present owner of the
facility and an owner at the time of
release.
Within a few years of Superfund's
passage, lower federal court deci-
sions had cleared up most of the
ambiguity and the basic parameters
of the statute were well defined.
Superfund, consistent with its reme-
dial character, was construed very
broadly and in a manner that
strongly favors governmental claims.
In fact, after the Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA) confirmed those
broad readings and added clarifica-
tion in a few substantive and proce-
dural areas, one commentator
described the government's case as
proceeding in the following manner.
"May it please the Court, I represent
the government and therefore I
win." Roger Marzulla, "Superfund
1991: How Insurance Firms Can
Help Clean Up the Nation's
Hazardous Waste," 4 Toxics Law
Reporter 685 (1989). Another say-
ing repeated among experts in the
area is that SARA was misnamed
and her name should have been
RACHEL, the Reauthorization Act
Confirms How Everyone's Liable.
For a good summary, see Elizabeth
Glass, "Superfund and SARA, Are
There Any Defenses Left? ," 12 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev 385 (1988).
Central among the key interpretive
rulings regarding § 107 were the
ones that imposed strict joint and
several liability on all of the poten-
tially responsible parties (PRPs)
without regard to which of the four
categories of PRP was involved. As
detailed more fully below, the deci-
sions require PRPs wishing to be
held responsible for less than the
full amount to prove that the harm
caused at the site is divisible. See,
e.g., oueu« Picillo, 883 F.2d 176
(1st Cir. 1989), cert. den., 493 U.S.
1071 (1990), which cited favorably
the first of many such decisions,
United States 'V. Chern-Dyne Corp.,
572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
The government's burden of proof
on causation of response costs is
also somewhat more favorable than
the norm for plaintiffs. The govern-
ment must prove only that an
arranger PRP had hazardous sub-
stances present at the facllity that
were of the type that caused the
government to incur response costs.
(See, e.g., United States 'V. Wade,
577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D.Pa. 1983).
Additionally, the last phrase of
§ 107(a)(4)(A), which referred to
recovery of costs "not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan,"
has been construed to allocate to
defendants the burden of proof on
that issue, so they must disprove
consistency by a preponderance of
the evidence.
The underlying rationale behind
these interpretations is that CER-
CLA is broadly remedial and should
be viewed in that light. CERCLA
was intended to implement the so-
called "Polluter Pays Principle."
Giving effect to that intent is espe-
cially apt when the choice is
between either internalizing the
cost on the parties who either
directly caused or contributed to
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the problem or benefited monetarily
from the activities that resulted in
the contamination, or else placing
the costs of cleanup on the govern-
ment, which must expend funds on
behalf of innocent victim taxpayers
and persons living near the contam-
ination. That logic also supports the
imposition of strict liability. The
statute has a retroactive effect in
the sense that the conduct giving
rise to the present contamination
being remediated might have
occurred years before CERCLA was
enacted, as was the case for some of
the contamination in the present
lawsuit.
The basics of this case fit a common
pattern in Superfund cases. A rela-
tively small entity operates a busi-
ness that deals with hazardous sub-
stances. A significant release of
those hazardous substances occurs,
and the small-entity operator can-
not or in any event does not imme-
diately remedy the situation. The
contamination spreads, usually in
the groundwater, and EPA and pos-
sibly the state undertake a costly
cleanup effort. Subsequently, EPA
and the state seek to recoup their
response costs from the PRPs under
CERCLA. In this case and many
others, the small-entity operator,
whose actions frequently appear to
be the single most obvious causative
factor in the case, is insolvent. As a
result, the other PRPs end up paying
that "orphan" share and all other
response costs as a result of
CERCLA's imposition of joint and
several liability. Their possible lines
of defense are very limited-each
PRP can try to show that it is not
within one of the four §107(a)(1-4)
categories, or a PRP may try to
show that the harm is divisible and
that it is responsible for only a dis-
tinct part of the harm, and therefore
only a specific portion of the total
response cost.
Historically, parties with a clear
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, relationship to the facility have had
only limited success in avoiding lia-
bility as a PRP, and the divisibility
defense has almost never succeeded
in litigation (only two or three
reported cases in almost 30 years).
What has been possible is for defen-
dants who pay joint and several Iia-
bility judgments to obtain contribu-
tion from other PRPs. The Supreme
Court has twice addressed how
CERCLA §§ 107 and 113(f) interre-
late and permit those contribution
claims to be lodged. See, United
States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,
127 U.S. 2331 (2007) and Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services,
Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004). In these
contribution situations, the court
uses its equitable discretion to
apportion the loss among the sol-
vent PRPs. Frequently, the courts
will refer to the "Gore factors,"
which were proposed by then-Sen.
Al Gore in an unenacted amend-
ment. These factors look at such
, things as the volume of the waste,
its toxicity in comparison to the
toxicity of other contaminants, and
a number of other parameters that
tend to suggest how much of the
cleanup effort might rationally be
apportioned to the activities of vari-
ous types of PRPs and among gener-
ators having wastes that were at the
facility where the release occurred.
ISSUES
Can Shell Oil Company (Shell),
whose involvement with operations
at the contaminated site consisted
primarily in the delivery of bulk
commercial products, be held liable
under the provision of the
Superfund Law that holds parties
who "arrange" for the disposal of
hazardous substances liable?
Did the court of appeals err when it
reversed the trial court's apportion-
ment of governmental response
costs that limited the liability of
defendants, and, instead, imposed
joint and several liability on Shell as
American Bar Association
an arranger and Burlington
Northern Railroad as an owner of
the facility from which the release
of hazardous substances occurred?
FACTS
The case has a complicated history.
In approximately 1983, after
groundwater contamination traced
to releases at the Brown & Bryant,
Inc. (B&B) agricultural chemical
facility in Arvin, California, threat-
ened to contaminate a municipal
supply aquifer, the EPA and State of
California undertook actions at the
site to address the soil and ground-
water contamination. In 1991, the
United States required Burlington
Northern, which owned and leased a
portion of the site to B&B, pursuant
to a CERCLA § 106 administrative
order, to install monitoring wells on
its portion of the larger B&B site. In
1992, Burlington Northern sued
B&B and others for contribution in
relation to costs incurred pursuant
to the EPA order. Four years later,
the United States and the State of
California each brought a separate
and more comprehensive action
seeking to recover their response
costs at the site from all PRPs,
which included both Burlington
Northern and Shell. The three cases
were then consolidated and District
Judge Oliver Wagner of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern
District of California heard a bench
trial and numerous post-trial
motions.
In July of 2003, Judge Wagner
entered detailed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law (see, 2003
WL 25518047). The most salient
rulings, for present purposes, are
that (1) Burlington Northern was a
responsible party due to its status as
an owner of the facility both at the
present time and at the time of
release, per CERCLA § 107(a)(1-2);
(2) Shell was a responsible party
due to its status as an arranger per
CERCLA § 107(a)(3); and (3)
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although the parties defended solely
on those issues and offered no basis
for apportioning the loss, the court
itself found a basis upon which to
issue judgments based on a division
of responsibility, and issued a judg-
ment apportioning 9 percent of the
total cost of cleanup to Burlington
Northern and 6 percent of the cost
to Shell. The effect of the apportion-
ment ruling was highly important
because the response costs at the
site for the efforts of the United
States and California exceeded $8
million, roughly one-twentieth of
which were costs incurred by
California. Burlington Northern also
spent an additional $5.6 million
under the federal administrative
order. With apportionment, the gov-
ernmental recoveries would be
reduced to about $1.2 million, with
the other $6.8 million being uncol-
lectible since other responsible par-
ties were insolvent or impossible to
identify.
Both sides appealed Judge Wagner's
rulings. A panel of the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the two findings of liability
and, with a minor carve out of
one portion of the cleanup cost,
reversed the finding that there
was a basis for division of the loss,
resulting in a joint and severallia-
bility judgment against Burlington
Northern and Shell for the vast
majority of the $8 million in govern-
mental response costs at the site.
The panel denied rehearing and the
full Ninth Circuit, by a close vote,
declined to grant a rehearing en
banco After that, certiorari was
sought and granted.
CASE ANALYSIS
On the ground, this case began in
1960, when B&B opened an agricul-
tural chemical distribution business
on a 3.8-acre parcel located in
Arvin, California. In 1975, B&B
expanded its operations by leasing
an adjacent 0.9-acre parcel from
two railroads, whose interest in that
(Continued on Page 298)
land was later transferred to defen-
dant Burlington Northern Railroad.
B&B's operations on the combined
parcel continued until 1989, when
B&B ceased its activities. As noted
above, B&B is now insolvent.
According to the record, the leased
parcel became an "integral part" of
the B&B agricultural chemical oper-
ations, and the two parcels were
operated as one. The Burlington
Northern portion of the combined
parcel was leased for the purpose of
parking "fertilizer rigs," which
included any vehicle used for the
application of the agricultural chem-
icals involved in this case. Those
rigs were rinsed and cleansed on the
Burlington part of the parcel. Drums
and cans containing residues of the
hazardous substances were left
there too. This resulted in spillage
and leakage of the hazardous sub-
stances on the Burlington Northern
portion of the site. The grade on the
leased parcel drained into a pond or
sump located on the B&B parcel.
The pond/sump was linked hydro-
logically to groundwater that served
as a municipal supply. The district
court found that Burlington
Northern is the present owner of a
facility from which there is a
release, making them a PRP under
CERCLA § 107(a)(1), and that they
were the owner at the time of a
release, making them a PRP under
§ 107(a)(2). These findings were
upheld on appeal and are not before
the Supreme Court.
Of the three agricultural chemicals
that account for the contamination
at the B&B facility, two were pesti-
cides supplied exclusively by Shell.
One is a soil fumigant called D-D
and the other is a pesticide called
"Nemagon," both of which attempt
to control nematodes, which attack
crop roots. The third contaminant
at the site was dinoseb, a weed
killer produced by numerous manu-
facturers, but not supplied to B&B
by Shell. All three of these chemi-
cals are-or contain-federally list-
ed hazardous (or extremely haz-
ardous) substances. Most of the dis-
cussion in the case as it is now
being litigated in the Supreme Court
focuses on D-D, which is a highly
corrosive and highly volatile liquid.
The volatility allows D-D to vaporize
after being injected into the soil,
which is how it kills nematodes.
D-D's corrosiveness and volatility,
combined with the fact that it is a
dense non-aqueous phase liquid
(DNAPL) (heavier than water), cre-
ate storage, handling, and contami-
nation problems, the latter being
particularly acute when water is
used to cleanse D-D residues from
equipment.
As with all elements of the factual
record, Judge Oliver made extensive
Findings of Fact in regard to the rela-
tionship of B&B to Shell as it affected
B&B's D-D handling practices.
The district court accepted that the
shipments were free on board
(f.o.b.), such that the shipper was
responsible for the D-D until it was
delivered to the B&B facility and
that title of the D-D changed hands
at that time, and even that Shell
"intended" that B&B should be
responsible for the handling of the
D-D after its arrival at B&B's Arvin
facility. (§ 21.) The court also found
facts relating to Shell's annual mar-
keting agreements with B&B for D-D
and requirements (inspections,
equipment upgrades, procedures for
receiving and handling D-D, etc.)
that suggested Shell had a continu-
ing relationship to the handing of D-
D. Shell imposed requirements on
its bulk resellers of D-D as a condi-
tion to be allowed to continue deliv-
eries of D-D. Other fact findings
explicitly noted that B&B, along
with most resellers or distributors of
D-D, was not in compliance with
Shell's requirements and that Shell
was fully aware of the spills that
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were endemic with operations such
as those of B&B and a major leak at
B&B due to tank corrosion. The
finding of facts also indicate that
even in light of this, Shell still con-
tinued to provide B&B with as much
D-D as B&B could resell. From these
findings the district court concluded
as follows:
The known, anticipated, and
inevitable leakage of D-D during
the delivery and unloading
process is a "disposal" within the
meaning of CERCLA Section
101(32). "Disposal" expressly
includes any "leaking", "spilling"
or "placing" of the hazardous
substance such that it may enter
the environment. The spilling
and placing of D-D in drip buck-
ets and pans under the tanker's
spigot, from which spills and
leakage resulted, is a "disposal"
because it is the "spilling" or
"placing" of a hazardous sub-
stance in a manner that causes it
to enter the environment. The
transfer process and unloading of
D-D from tanker trucks to the B
& B storage tanks inevitably
entailed leakage and spillage. The
process was effectively controlled
and arranged for by Shell. § 397
This finding was a central element
in ruling that Shell was a PRP as
an "arranger" under CERCLA
§ 107(a)(3).
Shell appealed the imposition of lia-
bility to the court of appeals. Shell
contended that the transfer of D-D
to B&B was a completed sale of a
useful "new product" at the time
the chemicals arrived f.o.b. at the
B&B location. According to Shell, all
subsequent spills by B&B or others
were beyond the scope of Shell's
responsibility. The court of appeals
panel affirmed the district court's
rejection of that argument. Shell has
renewed its argument that it should
not be liable as an arranger.
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Finally, there is the issue of appor-
tionment of the response costs for
which CERCLA holds PRPs liable.
The general approach in Superfund
cases is to apply joint and several
liability. That view grows out of the
application by the federal courts of
the principles of § 433A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The
Restatement indicates that when
the harm is indivisible and a defen-
dant's conduct is a substantial factor
in causing the harm, joint and sev-
eralliability will be imposed. In
Superfund cases the damage, conta-
mination of the environment, usual-
ly is viewed as indivisible.
Here the district court concluded,
"In the present case, the harm is a
single harm which consists of conta-
minated soil at various locations
and depths around the Site and one
mass (plume) of contaminated
groundwater." § 472. Consistent
, with the statutory intent of
Congress to apply the Polluter Pays
Principle," cases under CERCLA
place the burden of showing that
the harm caused by the release of
hazardous materials is divisible on
the defendants. In the words of the
district court, "Once liability has
been established, the burden shifts
to the defendant to demonstrate, by
a preponderance of the evidence,
that there exists a reasonable basis
for divisibility." § 453.
In this case, applying that approach
proved difficult for the district
court. Both Burlington Northern and
Shell relied on what the district
judge described as a "scorched
earth" line of defense, noting that
neither defendant "acknowledged an
iota of responsibility," and that,
"Neither party offered helpful argu-
ments to apportion liability," nor
had any party documented the rela-
tive contributions to the contamina-
tion from the two separate portions
of the overall parcel. (§§ 455, 477)
American Bar Association
The district court nevertheless pro-
ceeded to consider whether it could
provide a basis for equitable appor-
tionment, which it did. In relation
to Burlington Northern, the court
found that the railroad parcel com-
prised 19.1 percent of the total sur-
face area, and was in use for 13 of
the 29 years total operation (45 per-
cent). The district court assumed
that no D-D contamination originat-
ed on the railroad portion of the site
and that each of the three sub-
stances (D-D, Nemagon, and
dinoseb) was one third of the overall
contamination. That further
reduced the Burlington Northern
share to 6 percent of the total,
which the district court increased
by allowing for errors of up to 50
percent, for a final allocation of 9
percent. For Shell, the district
court, acknowledging no evidence
on the matter provided by Shell,
found that the spills related to the
"Shell controlled" deliveries of D-D
as a proportion of what it estimated
to the total amount of D-D released,
and calculated Shell's apportioned
share as 6 percent.
The government appealed the dis-
trict court ruling on apportionment.
The court of appeals reversed that
ruling and imposed joint and several
liability. In regard to Burlington
Northern, the court of appeals found
that the trial court's division of lia-
bility based on land area and dura-
tion of ownership, the equal treat-
ment of the three chemicals, and
the exclusion of D-D was clear error
(see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52) that lacked a reasonable basis in
the record. The court of appeals
found that the district court's calcu-
lation "bore insufficient logical con-
nection to the pertinent question:
What part of the contaminants
found on the Arvin parcel was
attributable to the presence of toxic
substances or to activities on the
Railroad parcel?"
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With regard to Shell, the court of
appeals also reversed the bulk of the
ruling on apportionment, assigning
joint and several liability for all
response costs except an amount
attributable to a dinoseb "hot spot"
for which specific cleanup costs
could be identified. As to that
amount, the court of appeals found
that no liability should attach to
Shell, since Shell never provided
any dinoseb at the facility. The
court of appeals again found the evi-
dence in the record insufficient to
support even a rough approximation
of Shell's proportional share of the
site's contamination. The D-D leak-
age evidence was insufficient
because the overall contamination
involved several chemicals and Shell
was responsible for more than just
the D-D. Moreover, the court of
appeals noted the total lack of evi-
dence Shell had provided on that
subject. In addition to saying that
Shell had failed to meet the burden
on a defendant seeking apportion-
ment, the court of appeals indicated
that Shell's failure to put in such
evidence was most likely a litigation
decision to "put its eggs in the no-
liability basket."
SIGNIFICANCE
If the Supreme Court reverses the
court of appeals, this case has the
potential to be significant in regard
to arranger liability, and even more
significant in regard to apportion-
ment of liability. Reversal of either
of the Ninth Circuit's holdings
would represent a major departure
from settled principles of Superfund
law as it has been consistently
applied for over two and a half
decades.
Shell's argument on arranger liabili-
ty has a superficial attractiveness to
it-it creates a bright-line test that
the sale and transfer of title to a
product ends the possibility of
Superfund liability for the product's
(Continued on Page 300)
producer. Such a rule would be rela-
tively easy to administer-it is easy
to identify when a sale has occurred
and transferred the goods to the
buyer. Exceptions would be needed
for things such as unavoidable
releases during use of the product
and in regard to sham transactions,
or when the seller exercises contin-
uing control despite delivery and
the passage of title (which is appar-
ently the case here). The questions
relating to those exceptions are
somewhat more complicated than
might first appear, as has been seen
under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act in cases that
struggle to decide whether disposal
is taking place when materials are
sold for recycling that is likely to
result in a later disposal of haz-
ardous wastes. The rule Shell seeks
also has a patina of reasonableness.
A commercial sale ends the seller's
relationship to the product and
whatever happens later is not the
seller's problem. Again, there may
be a need for exceptions when the
seller retains control or influence
over the buyer's subsequent actions,
as the district court found was the
case here. The government's posi-
tion would continue the status quo,
which is that the form of a transac-
tion is not dispositive and that what
matters is whether disposal occurs
as a result of the relationship.
In a similar manner, an affirmance
of the court of appeals apportion-
ment ruling will do little to change
well-established lower court prece-
dent that the burden is on the
defendant to prove there is a basis
for apportionment. What would be
new in that outcome is that the "
Supreme Court will have weighed in
on the subject and adopted the pre-
vailing approach that has made
apportionment very rare in cases
brought by the government to
recover response costs. In this case,
where there was no effort by the
defendants at trial to show a basis
for apportionment, it would be rela-
tively easy for the Supreme Court to
affirm on that basis alone.
The thing that makes this case dif-
ferent from past precedents is the
way in which the district court
reached out and sua sponte estab-
lished a basis for apportionment.
The appropriateness of that
approach is not necessarily going to
be decided by the Supreme Court
because of the way in which cases
are usually reviewed. The decision
of the court of appeals is actually
the decision being reviewed by the
Supreme Court, and that decision
can be affirmed or reversed without
answering the more general ques-
tion of whether the lower courts
should or should not follow the path
blazed by the district court. For
example, the court of appeals can
be affirmed by simply agreeing with
it that there was insufficient evi-
dence in the record to support a
finding of divisibility. Conversely,
the Supreme Court could reverse
and say the court of appeals erred
in finding the decision below lacked
a sufficient evidentiary basis.
Neither of those rulings would
require the Court to decide whether
a district court should, or should
not, take the initiative to impose
an allocation that was not sought
by the PRPs.
If it chooses to do so, the Supreme
Court could address the burdens
issue. It could, for example, affirm
the court of appeals by saying that
the issue of apportionment was not
properly raised in the district court.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court
could reverse the court of appeals,
which would, at a minimum, make
it clear that district courts may
make allocations of responsibility
, even when the parties have not
sought one. In a less dramatic fash-
ion, the Court could comment on
the action of the district court in
, dicta, giving an indication of its
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view regarding the degree of inven-
tiveness the trial court should use in
attempting to divide up responsibili-
ty. If the Supreme Court in any way
indicates that the district court's
approach is the proper one, that
aspect of the decision would mark a
huge sea change in CERCLA litiga-
tion. It seems more likely, however,
that the Supreme Court will limit
itself to reviewing the Ninth
Circuit's review of the district
court's review-and affirm or
reverse on that basis.
As a closing caveat, it is vital to
remember that the defendants on
whom joint and several liability is
imposed in cost-recovery actions
are not totally stuck. They are enti-
tled to bring contribution actions
against their co-PRPs in which a
court will have no choice but to
apportion the loss among the PRPs.
In the contribution cases, it is as if
all parties have the burden of proof
in trying to persuade the court what
is a reasonable division of responsi-
bility under the circumstances.
There is a sense in which the con-
tribution safety valve reduces pres-
sure on the Supreme Court to modi-
fy existing Superfund jurisprudence
on the apportionment issue in cost-
recovery cases, which might other-
wise seem unfair and oppressive.
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